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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Matthew George, who is serving a sentence for Virgin 
Islands criminal offenses, appeals an or der of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands denying his motion to vacate his 
sentence under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. George contends that he 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial 
because his attorney did not request a jury instruction to 
the effect that voluntary intoxication could negate the mens 
rea needed for the crime of assault in thefirst degree. We 
hold that counsel's performance was not deficient and that 
George was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request 
the instruction in question, and we therefor e affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In 1992, George was charged by infor mation in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands with attempted murder 
in the first degree, in violation of 14 V.I. CODE ANN. SS 331 
& 922(a)(1); possession of a deadly weapon during a violent 
crime, in violation of 14 V.I. CODE ANN. S 2251(a)(2)(B); and 
kidnaping, in violation of 14 V.I. CODE  ANN. S 1051. 
Although the charges against George wer e all based on 
territorial law, at the time in question, the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands, rather than the T erritorial Court, had 
jurisdiction. See Callwood v. Enos, 230 F .3d 627, 631 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 
The charges against George stemmed fr om an incident 
involving George, two of his co-workers, Domingo Solis and 
Rusty Hilliard, and the victim, Larry McCor mick. The 
evidence at trial showed the following. McCor mick had been 
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living in a trailer with George's brother and his girlfriend. 
One evening, George, Solis, and Hilliar d went to the trailer 
and told McCormick that George's br other wanted him to 
move out. McCormick packed his things, put them in the 
trunk of Solis's car, and the four men dr ove away. 
McCormick asked to be taken to Christiansted, but Solis 
took him to another spot on St. Croix called Salt River. 
After McCormick took his belongings fr om the trunk, 
McCormick scuffled with George and Hilliard, and 
eventually George picked up Hilliard's knife and slit 
McCormick's throat. McCormick said:"[M]y jugular vein's 
been cut, please take me to the hospital." Geor ge reportedly 
commented: "Good, I hope you die," and he dr ove away 
with Solis and Hilliard. McCormick tied a t-shirt around his 
neck. A passing motorist picked him up, and he was given 
first aid and medical treatment that saved his life. In 
George's defense, several witnesses testified that George 
had been drinking very heavily prior to the incident and 
was intoxicated. 
 
The trial judge instructed the jury concerning the 
elements of the offense of attempted mur der and the lesser 
included offenses of assault in the first degree, 14 V.I. CODE 
ANN. S 295(1),2 and assault in the third degree, 14 V.I. CODE 
ANN. S 297.3 The judge also instructed the jury that 
intoxication may make it impossible for a person to form 
the specific intent needed for attempted mur der, but the 
judge did not give a similar instruction relating to assault 
in the first degree. George's attor ney argued at some length 
that assault in the first degree is a specific intent crime, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This provision states: 
 
       Whoever- 
 
       (1) with intent to commit murder, assaults another . . . . shall be 
       imprisoned not more than 15 years. 
 
3. This provision states in relevant part: 
 
       Whoever, under circumstances not amounting to an assault in the 
       first or second degree- 
 
       (1) assaults another person with intent to commit a felony . . . . 
       shall be fined not less than $500 and not mor e than $3,000 or 
       imprisoned not more than 5 years or both. 
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but the judge rejected her arguments, and she did not 
make a formal request for an intoxication instruction 
relating to this offense. 
 
The jury acquitted George of attempted mur der and 
kidnaping, but convicted him of assault in the first degree 
and possession of a deadly weapon during a violent crime. 
He was sentenced to consecutive terms of fifteen years for 
assault and five years for possession of a deadly weapon. 
 
In his direct appeal, George's only ar gument was that the 
trial judge improperly admitted photographs of 
McCormick's injuries. We upheld his conviction in an 
unpublished decision. See Government of the Virgin Islands 
v. George, 16 F.3d 403 (3d Cir . 1993). George next filed a 
motion in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 2255. 
The District Court denied this motion, and thr ee judges of 
our Court granted his application for a certificate of 
appealability on the question of whether his trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to request an intoxication 
instruction concerning the offense of assault in the first 
degree. 
 
II. 
 
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must 
consider whether the District Court had jurisdiction to 
entertain George's motion under 28 U.S.C.S 2255. Shortly 
before the argument in this case, our court handed down 
three opinions that clarified the structur e of collateral 
review of Virgin Islands cases in light of the 1984 
amendments of the Revised Organic Act and subsequent 
territorial legislation. See Callwood v. Enos , 230 F.3d 627 
(3d Cir. 2000); Parrott v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 230 
F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2000); W alker v. Gov't of the Virgin 
Islands, 230 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2000). Both George and the 
appellees take the position that George was entitled to 
proceed under S 2255 and was not r equired instead to 
exhaust his territorial remedies.4  We agree.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Government could of course waive exhaustion, but under 28 
U.S.C. 2254(b)(3), "[a] State may not be deemed to have waived the 
exhaustion requirement . . . unless the State, through counsel, expressly 
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Although George was prosecuted and convicted solely for 
territorial -- not federal -- offenses, and although the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands would not have 
jurisdiction today to try a case such as Geor ge's, his S 2255 
motion falls squarely within the terms ofS 2255, which 
provides that "[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a 
court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to 
be released upon the ground that the sentence was 
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States . . . may move the court which imposed the 
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 
George is in custody under sentence of the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands, which was established by Act of 
Congress, see 48 U.S.C. S 116(a); he claims the right to be 
released on the ground that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
and the Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. S 1561; and he filed 
his motion with the court that imposed the sentence, i.e., 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands. We see no reason 
why S 2255 should not be applied to a case such as this in 
accordance with its plain terms. 
 
The three recent decisions noted above ar e entirely 
consistent with this conclusion. We begin with Parrott 
because, like the present case, it involved a collateral attack 
by a prisoner who had been convicted in the District Court 
for a territorial offense. The prisoner in that case filed a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the T erritorial Court, 
and we held that the Territorial Court possessed 
jurisdiction to entertain that petition. We r easoned that 
Congress had authorized the Legislature of the Virgin 
Islands to divest the District Court of jurisdiction over 
purely local civil matters by vesting such jurisdiction in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
waives the requirement." Here, the United States Attorney has argued 
that we should hear this appeal and should not r equire George to 
exhaust his territorial remedies, but because counsel has not in so many 
words waived exhaustion, we cannot deem the r equirement to be waived. 
 
5. As we recently noted, "since 1949 the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands has had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 over petitions 
brought by prisoners challenging the imposition of sentences by that 
court." Callwood, 230 F.3d at 632 n.5. 
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Territorial Court; that the Legislatur e had done so; that a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus fell within this grant of 
jurisdiction; and that a previously enacted territorial law 
conferring upon the District Court the jurisdiction to 
entertain habeas petitions, 5 V.I. CODE  ANN. S 1303, had in 
effect been modified. 
 
We see nothing in Parrott that suggests that the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain George's S 2255 
motion. Under Parrott, George could have elected to attack 
his conviction by filing a habeas petition in the Territorial 
Court, but it does not follow that George was not also 
entitled to proceed, if he wished, by filing a S 2255 motion 
in the court of conviction, i.e., the District Court. Parrott 
said nothing about S 2255, and we do not think that the 
territorial law that effectively divested the District Court of 
general civil jurisdiction over purely local matters impliedly 
precludes that Court from exercising the authority quite 
explicitly granted by S 2255. 
 
Our reasoning in Callwood supports this analysis. In 
Callwood, we held that a prisoner serving a sentence for 
territorial offenses could challenge his par ole proceedings 
by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 2241 in the District Court. After noting that the 
District Court does not now have jurisdiction under the 
Virgin Islands Code to entertain habeas petitions, we held 
that the District Court's jurisdiction under S 2241 had not 
been affected by the amendments to the Revised Organic 
Act or the new territorial legislation. Moreover, we observed 
that "[n]othing in the 1984 amendments [to the Revised 
Organic Act] affects the authority of the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands to issue relief under S 2255, where 
applicable." Callwood, 230 F.3d at 632 n.5. 
 
Finally, in Walker, we held that a prisoner convicted of 
territorial offenses in the Territorial Court could file a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254 in the District Court and that in such a case the 
procedural requirements applicable to such a petition, 
including the need to obtain a certificate of appealability 
and the need to exhaust territorial remedies, would apply. 
We see nothing in Walker that suggests that George was not 
entitled to proceed under S 2255. 
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In sum, we hold that the Parrott-Callwood-Walker trilogy 
presents no obstacle to the filing of a motion under S 2255 
in the District Court of the Virgin Islands by a prisoner 
convicted in that court for a territorial of fense. Needless to 
say, this holding has no application to prisoners convicted 
of territorial offenses in the Territorial Court. 
 
III. 
 
We now turn to the merits. Geor ge argues that assault in 
the first degree is a specific intent crime, i.e., that it 
requires proof of the specific intent needed for murder in 
the first degree, "willfulness, deliberation, and 
premeditation." See Government of the Virgin Islands v. 
Martinez, 780 F.2d 302, 305 (3d Cir . 1985). He notes that 
voluntary intoxication may be a defense with r espect to an 
offense requiring specific intent. See 14 V.I. CODE ANN. S 16; 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Commissiong, 706 F. 
Supp. 1172, 1182 (D.V.I. 1989); see also Montana v. 
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 47 (1996) (plurality); United States v. 
Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 253 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 37, 47 (3d Cir. 1989); 1 W. LaFave 
& A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law S 3.5(e), at 315 & n. 
61 (2d ed. 1986). He therefore asserts that it was 
fundamental error for his trial counsel to not request an 
instruction relating to this offense. In response, the 
Government argues that assault in thefirst degree under 
Virgin Islands 14 V.I. CODE ANN. S 295(1) is a general intent 
crime, i.e., that it requires only pr oof of malice, not 
willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation, and that 
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent 
offense. See 14 V.I. CODE ANN. S 16; Commissiong, 706 
F.Supp. at 1182 ("voluntary intoxication .. . cannot negate 
malice"). Moreover, the Gover nment contends that even if 
assault in the first degree is a crime of specific intent, 
George's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. 
 
A. 
 
In assessing George's argument, our analysis must begin 
with the "strong presumption" that counsel's performance 
was reasonable. See Strickland v. W ashington, 466 U.S. 
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668, 689 (1984). "The defendant must over come the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged 
action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' " Id. at 
689; United States v. Kauffman, 109 F .3d 186, 189-90 (3d 
Cir. 1997). "It is [ ] only the rare claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel that should succeed under the 
properly deferential standard to be applied in scrutinizing 
counsel's performance." United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 
702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel 
must satisfy the two-pronged test announced by the 
Supreme Court in Strickland. To do so, the defendant must 
show "(1) that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the 
result would have been different." United States v. Nino, 
878 F.2d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687-96); see also Kauffman, 109 F.3d at 190. Both 
Strickland prongs must be satisfied. See Nino, 878 F.2d at 
104. George is unable to satisfy either . 
 
B. 
 
In assessing the first prong -- whether counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness -- it is not necessary for us to decide 
whether assault in the first degree is a specific - or general 
- intent crime under Virgin Islands law. If the Government 
is correct that it is a general intent crime, the intoxication 
defense would not be applicable, and counsel could not be 
found to have acted unreasonably for failing to request an 
intoxication instruction. On the other hand, even if George 
is correct that assault in the first degr ee is a specific-intent 
crime, his counsel's representation still satisfied the 
relevant standard of reasonableness. As the Supreme Court 
has stated, "a court deciding an actual inef fectiveness claim 
must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged 
conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the 
time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 
The record in this case shows that the trial judge and 
counsel for both sides engaged in a lengthy discussion 
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about the mens rea required for assault in the first degree. 
See App. 215-32. During this exchange, Geor ge's counsel 
argued repeatedly that assault in thefirst degree is a 
specific-intent crime. See App. 217-23. However, the judge 
disagreed and concluded that it is a general-intent crime. 
See App. 228. 
 
In light of this colloquy, we conclude that the 
performance of George's trial counsel did not fall below the 
level demanded by the Sixth Amendment. It is well 
established that voluntary intoxication may be a defense to 
a crime of specific intent but not to a crime of general 
intent, and it is apparent that the trial judge was familiar 
with this rule, because he gave an intoxication instruction 
with respect to the specific-intent of fense of attempted 
murder but not with respect to assault in the first degree, 
which he believed to be a general-intent offense. Thus, by 
arguing that assault in the first degr ee is a specific-intent 
crime, George's trial attorney tried to persuade the trial 
judge to accept a proposition that was the necessary 
predicate for obtaining an intoxication instruction. When 
the judge rejected defense counsel's mens r ea arguments, 
the argument for obtaining an intoxication instruction was 
logically doomed. George's trial counsel pr eserved the mens 
rea argument for appeal, and we do not think that the 
Sixth Amendment required her to go further and make a 
futile, formal request for an intoxication instruction. 
Accordingly, we hold that George cannot satisfy the first 
prong of Strickland. 
 
C. 
 
Nor can George satisfy the second prong. Under this 
prong, we must decide whether there is a r easonable 
probability that the result of the trial would have been 
different if George's counsel had r equested an intoxication 
instruction relating to assault in the first degree. As 
discussed above, the trial judge's view that assault in the 
first degree is a general intent crime logically doomed any 
request for an intoxication instruction r elated to that 
offense. Therefore, even if counsel had done precisely what 
George now alleges she erred in failing to do, the jury still 
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would not have been instructed about this defense, and the 
outcome of the trial would have remained the same. 
 
IV. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the District 
Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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